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WHEN ARE THERE MORE LAWS?  WHEN DO THEY 
MATTER?  USING GAME THEORY TO COMPARE LAWS, 
POWER DISTRIBUTION, AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
Ji Li† 
Abstract: In several recent cases, the Supreme People’s Court of China ruled that 
local police owe a positive duty to protect individual members of the general public.  In 
strong contrast, the United States Supreme Court declared in two police nonfeasance 
cases that such duty did not exist under the Federal Constitution.  This is counterintuitive, 
because one would expect that in a liberal democracy where the judiciary is independent 
and powerful, judges would impose higher standard on local law enforcement officers.  
One possible explanation is that law does not matter in a developing country such as 
China, so laws are drafted and interpreted in favor of citizens for the purpose of window-
dressing.  But if law does not matter at all, why are some proposed laws drafted 
numerous times before passing the legislature?  A conceptual game theory model is able 
to resolve both the empirical puzzle and the theoretical one.  In addition, this interactive 
model can be applied to explain a broad range of issues in law and politics.  The theory is 
illustrated by the judicial politics of bankruptcy law in China, the making of bankruptcy 
law in Vietnam, the Chinese law on governmental liability, the American law on police 
nonfeasance, and changes in the governmental liability law in South Korea. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this paper is to explain the relationship between laws on 
the books and power politics from a comparative perspective.  The seed for 
this research is an empirical puzzle that springs forth from a comparison of 
governmental liability law on police nonfeasance between China and the 
United States.  The following two cases, both of which center on police 
inaction, trigger the theoretical question.  
In the first case, the plaintiff is a young woman who wanted to break 
off her relationship with a man after learning he was already married.  The 
man threatened violence and the woman sought police protection several 
times.  Unfortunately, no assistance was provided.  A thug hired by the man 
threw acid on her face, deforming her and blinding her in one eye.  The court 
found no tort liability for the police’s failure to provide specific protection to 
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a member of the public from harm done by another member of the public 
and dismissed the case.1 
In the second case, the plaintiff is a businesswoman who managed a 
gift shop.  There was a motel across the street.  Early one morning, 
disturbing noises woke two guests staying in the motel.  They suspected a 
burglary at the gift shop, and informed the motel manager.  After a cursory 
inspection, the motel manager was certain of a robbery at the gift shop.  The 
manager called the local police department twice and reported the ongoing 
crime.  No police officer was dispatched.  After about twenty minutes, the 
thief left with his booty.  Thereafter, the store manager filed a complaint 
with the police department but got no response.  After the business owner 
filed a lawsuit, the court found the police department liable for failure to 
protect the property of a member of the public and awarded damages equal 
to half of the total loss borne by the plaintiff. 2   
One of these two cases was decided in a democracy with arguably the 
most sophisticated judicial system in the world, and the other in an 
authoritarian regime where a functional legal institution barely existed three 
decades ago.  For the uninitiated, a reasonable assumption is that the second 
case was decided in a democratic setting with a better and more independent 
judiciary.  The decision in the first case seems to substantially favor the 
unresponsive police department, therefore it must be from a country with 
little governmental accountability and weak courts.  This intuition is wrong, 
however.  The first case was decided in the United States,3 the second in 
China.4  The former is a liberal democracy, and the latter an authoritarian 
state with a weak judiciary.  
In this article, I attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction.  I 
contend that the power distribution of potential litigants, professional norms, 
and judicial independence determine how laws are applied and the costs 
associated with their application, which exerts significant impact on the way 
laws are drafted, legislated, and interpreted.  I argue that this theory is more 
powerful than extant approaches in explaining the link between power 
politics and law-making.  
This article proceeds as follows.  Section II surveys American and 
Chinese jurisprudence on official nonfeasance.  Section III discusses extant 
theories and shows that they are insufficient to explain some empirical 
                                                 
1
  See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579 (N.Y. 1968). 
2
  Yin Chenyan v. the Public Security Bureau of Lushi County, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Issue 2, 
2003, at 36 (People’s Court of Lushi County, Dec. 12, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). 
3
  See Riss, 22 N.Y.2d 579.  
4
  See Yin Chenyan, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Issue 2, 2003, at 36. 
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puzzles.  Section IV provides the interactive theory, my game theory model 
and examines two scenarios when different payoffs are assigned.  Section V 
presents empirical evidence from United States, China, Vietnam, and Korea 
that supports the interactive theory.  Section VI concludes the article.   
II. THE COUNTERINTUITIVE CONTRAST REFLECTS DIFFERENCES IN LAW 
This section provides a survey of American and Chinese 
jurisprudence on official nonfeasance, showing that the cases described 
above accurately reflect the differences in law between these countries.  
These differences can only be adequately considered with knowledge of 
comparative police nonfeasance laws in the United States and China.  To be 
more specific, what are the laws on governmental liability in police 
nonfeasance cases in the two countries?  In the United States, the general 
rule is that a municipal corporation is not liable for injuries caused by police 
nonfeasance absent statutes prescribing exceptions to government 
immunity.5  Some courts have upheld claims against municipal corporations 
when a special relationship was established between the police and the 
plaintiff.6  A state court in New York specified the four elements of such 
special relationships:  
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises 
or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party 
who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the 
municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some 
form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the 
injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the 
municipality’s affirmative undertaking.7 
Only when these four elements exist may a plaintiff prevail in a suit against 
the municipal corporation for police nonfeasance.  In cases related to 
emergency phone calls, if the caller is not the victim, the last two conditions 
are not satisfied.  Therefore, it is almost certain that absent statutory 
provisions, state courts in the United States will find for the municipal 
corporation in a case like Yin Chenyan v. Police Department of Lushi 
County.  
Federal courts hold a similar view.  Under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, the United States is found liable: 
                                                 
5
  Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure to 
Provide Police Protection from Crime, 90 A.L.R. 5th 273 (2005). 
6
  See id. 
7
  See Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260 (N.Y. 1987) (citations omitted). 
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for injuries resulting from a failure to provide police protection, 
where the decision not to provide this protection (1) was made 
by an agent of the United States performing a “discretionary” 
function or duty within the scope of his employment under 28 
U.S.C.A. § 2680(a), and (2) was the proximate cause of the 
injuries complained of.8  
Because the burden of proof of foreseeability is on the plaintiff, prevailing in 
a public tort case on police inaction is a daunting task. 
In general, the standard for governmental immunity has been set by 
the Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services,9 where an abused child sued the county government for failure to 
provide protection against his abuser.10  He claimed the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution imposed on the State an affirmative duty to 
protect the petitioner.11  The Court held that “nothing in the language of the 
Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and 
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors,”12 though it 
suggested that state tort laws might impose a positive duty of police 
protection.13  DeShaney has been the controlling case since 1989.  In 2004, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a similar case arising from the Tenth 
Circuit.14  In Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, the plaintiff had a 
restraining order issued by the local court against her husband. 15   Although 
she presented it to the police and requested assistance enforcing it several 
times in the same day, the police failed to respond.16  The plaintiff’s three 
children were murdered by her husband during this time.17  In the suit 
against the local government, the plaintiff’s lawyer raised a procedural due 
process claim, in addition to the substantive due process claim that has been 
rejected by the Court in DeShaney.  However, the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 
opinion, held that due process clause did not entitle respondent a property 
                                                 
8
  Allan L. Schwartz, Liability of United States Under Federal Tort Claims Act for Injuries Resulting 
from Failure to Provide Police Protection, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 903 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
9
  489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
10
  Id. at 191. 
11
  See id. 
12
  Id. at 258. 
13
   Id. at 201-202. 
14
  Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F. 3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom, Town of Castle 
Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
15
  545 U.S. 748, __, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2801 (2005). 
16
  Id. at 2801-2802. 
17
  Id. at 2802. 
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interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband, 
thus maintaining its overall position on the issue.18  
China, unlike the United States, is a civil law country; precedents do 
not control as much as they do in a common law country.  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme People’s Court regularly publishes typical cases that function as 
clarifications of existing statutes.  Since no specific statutes exist on 
governmental official nonfeasance liability, the Supreme People’s Court 
created the doctrine from scratch by publishing a few cases that had broadly 
interpreted extant laws.  The first one concerns a villager in Sichuan 
Province who sued the township police claiming that their failure to take 
action against his neighbor, who suffered from a serious mental disorder and 
repetitively harassed him, contributed to an injury incurred while trying to 
escape from the neighbor.19  The People’s Supreme Court heard the case 
because there was not a clear doctrine providing any remedy for official 
nonfeasance such as police inaction.  The Court opined that Public Security 
Bureaus had a positive duty to protect citizens and they should be held liable 
for the injury and damage due to their nonfeasance, if their action could have 
prevented the injury.  This decision was promulgated as an official legal 
interpretation in 2001.20 
Later the Court went even further by publishing Yin Chenyan v. Police 
Department of Lushi County, in which the county court found the local 
police department liable for property damage due to police inaction.21  As 
discussed above, there was no special relationship between the plaintiff and 
the police department.22  The person who made the emergency call was not 
the victim and the damage was inflicted by a third party actor.  Given the 
facts of the case and extant statutes in China that were silent about 
government liability for police nonfeasance, it is surprising the Supreme 
People’s Court’s clearly signaled that local police, especially emergency call 
departments, owe a positive duty to protect the general public who resort to 
their assistance through emergency calls.  
In sum, the comparison between the current laws in China and the 
United States indicates that, counter-intuitively, the law ostensibly provides 
better protection to Chinese citizens against government officials than their 
counterparts in America.   
                                                 
18
  Id. at 2810. 
19
  Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, 
THE CHINA JOURNAL, Jan. 2004, at 92, 92.  
20
  Id. 
21
  Yin Chenyan v. the Public Security Bureau of Lushi County, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Issue 2, 
2003, at 36 (People’s Court of Lushi County, Dec. 12, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). 
22
  Id. 
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The development of China’s administrative law regime in which the 
Supreme People’s Court published these two decisions provides background 
critical to understanding the import of the decisions.  The current Chinese 
Constitution provides that “citizens who have suffered losses through 
infringement of their civil rights by any state organ or functionary have the 
right to compensation in accordance with the law.”23  Unlike in the United 
States, however, the Chinese Constitution is not directly enforceable “unless 
there are statutes that clearly mandate the courts to do so.”24   
No concrete administrative law existed until 1987, when the “drafting 
of an Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) commenced.”25  The law was 
passed two years later and gave citizens a legal basis to sue government 
officials.26  This legal reform is significant given that China has had more 
than a thousand years of autocracy.  
Administrative law legislation grew quickly in the 1990s.  The 
Standing Committee of the People’s Congress passed the State 
Compensation Law in 1994, which was followed by the Administrative 
Penalty Law, the Administrative Supervision Law, and the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law in 1996, 1997, and 1999 respectively.27  In 2003, the 
People’s Congress passed the Administrative Licensing Law, which was 
regarded as a landmark law that facilitated the withdrawal of the state from 
the market.28  All these administrative laws stipulate reasonably well the 
power of the government and the remedies for the abuse of power by 
government officials. 
Section I presents two cases of official nonfeasance with 
counterintuitive results.  This section surveys American and Chinese 
jurisprudence on official nonfeasance in which the two cases are embedded, 
but this context alone fails to fully explain the counterintuitive outcomes, 
and the puzzle remains.  The highest court in the United States, a liberal 
democracy, when faced with the balancing of various interests and 
constitutional doctrines, decided twice against citizen victims in government 
nonfeasance cases.  In contrast, the highest court in China, a one-party 
regime, created legal rights against official nonfeasance from scratch.  What 
                                                 
23
  Art. 41, Chapter 1, P.R.C. Constitution.  English translation is available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited January 7, 2007). 
24
  Xixin Wang, Suing the Sovereign Observed from the Chinese Perspective: The Idea and Practice 
of State Compensation in China, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 681, 682 (2003). 
25
  RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 398 (2000).  
26
  Id. 
27
  Id. 
28
  Randall Peerenboom, What Have We Learned About Law and Development?  Describing, 
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 823, 841 (2006). 
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explains the dramatic differences?  Before presenting my theory, I review in 
Section III extant theoretical approaches to relevant empirical questions.  
III. EXTANT THEORIES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN THE EMPIRICAL 
PUZZLE 
Many legal scholars and social scientists have spent time exploring 
legal reform in China, drawing two main conclusions.  Some argue that the 
Chinese government acts sincerely in promoting the rule of law, while others 
take a dismissive view of the current legal reform in China.29   Neither 
theory adequately explains the actual outcomes of lawmaking and 
application within China.  
Fully aware of the benefits of ruling the country according to the law, 
the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) built an administrative law regime 
and allowed the People’s Supreme Court to indicate its preference for broad 
interpretation of the laws.  Although few predict that China will achieve the 
type of rule of law embedded in a liberal democracy, some see China as 
being “in transition from an instrumental rule-by-law legal system in which 
law is a tool to be used as the Party-state sees fit to a rule of law system 
where law does impose meaningful restraints on the Party, state and 
individual members of the ruling elite.”30 
Randall Peerenboom notes that plaintiffs have a much higher rate of 
success in administrative litigations in China than in Japan, Taiwan, or the 
United States.31  Although he admits that a conclusion cannot be drawn 
without further studying the merits of cases, he argues that “clearly the 
courts are not just a rubber stamp; they do have some authority.”32  
Peerenboom sees an evolution of the Chinese social and political system, in 
which an increasingly dynamic civil society demands a better legal 
institution.  In response to this demand, the CCP supplies the laws, which 
the judiciary, motivated by both external and internal incentives, interprets 
and applies assiduously.33  This series of movements feeds back into the 
growth of the civil society, and the cultivation of a more active legal culture.  
                                                 
29
  See Benjamin Liebman, Legal Aid, Lawyers, and Legitimacy in China, in RAISING THE BAR 318 
(William P. Alford ed., forthcoming 2007); PEERENBOOM, supra note 25, at 398; HONGYING WANG, WEAK 
STATE, STRONG NETWORKS, THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
(2001).  
30
  Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law 
Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 190 (2001).  
31
  Id. at 217. 
32
  Id. 
33
  Id. at 163-164. 
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Besides the figures showing the increase of administrative cases and 
the high winning rates for citizens, however, Peerenboom provides 
insufficient evidence to convince readers that the administrative laws on the 
books are being enforced to any meaningful extent.  In fact, there is solid 
evidence that new laws are not effective in restraining government 
officials.34  For instance, in the last few years, the letter and petition system, 
which is a formal but allegedly ineffective channel for individuals to protest 
against the abuses of government officials, has received a growing number 
of complaints.35  If administrative laws are better enforced, why would more 
citizens resort to the letter and petition system for protection and dispute 
resolution?  Moreover, even if an authoritarian state ties its own hands for a 
short time in order to add credibility to its commitment to the rule of law, 
what in theory can prevent it from reneging, especially when its legitimacy 
is threatened?  
In contrast to the evolutionists, some scholars take a dismissive view 
of the current legal reform in China.  Hongying Wang argues that China is a 
society built on networks where the law does not matter.  Even though the 
laws on the books look good, Chinese courts cannot apply them in many 
situations, mainly due to their institutional weakness.36   
Woo provides a list of factors that restrain judicial power: 
Judges are typically drawn from the area where they reside, 
and . . . the budget for each court is determined by the local 
government where the court sits.  Local allocation of funds for 
judicial services . . . has also rendered courts dependent on the 
whims of local ties and relationships.37   
In addition, Alford doubts the real impact of the progress China has made in 
creating formal rules and institutions.38  
Many scholars even question the validity of studying the rule of law in 
a non-democracy.  Moustafa points out that “[t]he vast majority of political 
scientists and public law scholars assume that democracy is a prerequisite 
                                                 
34
  See O’Brien, supra note 19, at 76. 
35
  Zeng Zhiquan, She Song Xin Fang Wei He Sheng Er Bu Jiang (Why Does Litigation-Related 
Letter and Petition Increase?), available at http://jdzol.com.cn/qiye/shownews.asp?NewsID=8782 (last 
accessed on April 27, 2006). 
36
  See Wang, supra note 24. 
37
  Margaret Y. K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE 
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 170 (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, Asian Law Series No. 14, 2000).  
38
  William Alford, The More Law, The More…? Measuring Legal Reform in the People’s Republic 
of China, in HOW FAR ACROSS THE RIVER?: CHINESE POLICY REFORM AT THE MILLENNIUM 122, 130-33 
(Nicholas C. Hope, Dennis Tao Yang & Mu Yang Li eds., 2003). 
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for the judicialization of politics.”39  And because of this assumption, there 
has been “an almost total neglect of the study of judicial politics in 
authoritarian settings.”40  
In sum, according to the dismissive view, the reason China has 
ostensibly more binding administrative law than the United States is that 
laws do not matter in the former; they are simply a window dressing.  
Although this argument has some merits, it over-simplifies the 
situation.  If laws were just for show, one would expect to see today’s China 
equipped with well-drafted laws of substantial sophistication in all areas.  
This argument cannot explain why the government spent years revising the 
drafts of certain laws, in order to get them through the legislature, e.g. the 
new bankruptcy law.  Moreover, the argument cannot explain why in the last 
decade or so, the ruling party has started paying attention to the construction 
of an administrative regime.  
In short, existing theories either give an oversimplified explanation 
that laws do not matter in China, or an ill-supported conclusion that the 
country is moving steadily towards the rule of law.  I contend in this paper 
that an interdisciplinary approach focusing on power distribution will shed 
more light on the interplay between changes in legal codes and domestic 
politics.  Although for a long time few scholars have put democracies and 
non-democracies together when it comes to the study of judicial politics, 
recent scholarship has moved toward interdisciplinary research and started to 
explore the relationship between the commitment to laws on the books and 
political structure.  Garrett and others employ a game theory model to 
explain the strategic decision-making process of the European Court of 
Justice.41  They argue that if the Court anticipates strong resistance from 
member states, it will avoid rendering an adverse decision.42  Thus, the 
extant laws have been correlated with the perceived state interests and the 
institutional structure of the European Union.43  Based on extensive data 
analysis, Hathaway argues quite convincingly that a country’s decision to 
sign a human rights treaty is determined to a great extent by the estimated 
costs of and probability of compliance.44  As a result, non-democracies that 
have weak internal legal enforcement systems may be more likely to sign a 
                                                 
39
  Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 883, 884 (2003). 
40
  Id. 
41
  See generally Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The European Court of 
Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG 149 (1998). 
42
  See id. at 174. 
43
  See id.  
44
  See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1838-39 (2003).  
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treaty than a democracy that enjoys the rule of law, even though the latter’s 
record of human rights protection is much better than the former’s.45  
Although both Garrett and Hathaway focus on international judicial politics, 
and the unit of analysis in their studies is the individual state, their theories 
relate to the question this paper attempts to answer.  That is, the way laws on 
the books are drafted, legislated, and interpreted is influenced by the 
probability that they will be applied and the associated costs, which is 
further determined by professional norms, judicial independence and 
authority, and the power distribution of potential litigants.  
IV. AN INTERACTIVE THEORY PROVIDES A BETTER EXPLANATION OF 
JUDICIAL POLITICS 
This section presents a game theoretic model that I believe better 
explains the empirical puzzle discussed in Section I and II.  I create this 
simplified game structure to model the interaction among various actors in 
the drafting, interpretation, legislation and enforcement of laws.  Different 
payoffs will be assigned when the game is applied to different legal 
environments.  Before delving into the more technical discussion, I briefly 
describe the model in plain English.  
The game illustrates my argument that legal environment and the 
power distribution of potential litigants implicated by a contemplated law 
determine how that law is drafted, interpreted, and legislated.  For example, 
suppose a drafted law or a new legal interpretation comes to the legislature, 
and the legislators need to decide what to do about it.  To simplify the 
argument, I assume that only those who will be affected by the legal change 
will react in the legislature.  If the law is against one legislator’s 
constituency, will he or she oppose the draft or interpretation?  Since 
resistance tends to be costly, the legislator’s decision depends on the costs of 
noncompliance, which is further related to the level of law enforcement.   
In a strong rule of law environment, e.g. the United States, laws are 
expected to be enforced.  So the calculation is easy.  The constituency the 
drafted law or interpretation disfavors will oppose it to the extent that the 
cost of resistance is lower than the cost of noncompliance.  But in a country 
with a weak judiciary, laws are enforced in only two situations: (1) when 
they extend the interests of the powerful; and (2) when the implicated 
constituencies are equally powerful.   
Therefore, in a weak rule of law environment, a drafted law or legal 
interpretation favoring the politically weak constituency will go through the 
                                                 
45
  Id.  
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legislature because the politically powerful constituency will not oppose it, 
believing that the costs of noncompliance are low due to the ultimate lack of 
enforcement.  That is why the highest court in China was able to create legal 
rights against official nonfeasance from scratch.  Whereas, a contemplated 
law that implicates the interests of two equally powerful constituencies will 
not be enacted without a series of compromises.  This explains why the 
drafted bankruptcy law in China took many years to be approved by the 
Congress, leaving a saga of trading of interests.  I will present more 
empirical evidence for the theory in Section IV. 
 




There are four players in this game.  Player 1 (“P1”) represents those 
who draft or interpret laws.  They are normally composed of distinguished 
legal scholars or judges of the highest court.  Player 2 (“P2”) and Player 3 
(“P3”) are those whose behaviors will be governed by the drafted or 
interpreted law.  I assume they take adversarial positions in a suit that falls 
under the jurisdiction of the law.  Player 4 (“P4”) refers to those responsible 
for the application of the law.  They are normally composed of local 
judges.46  
A. Stage 1  
The way the law is drafted and interpreted is a variable.  P1 is faced 
with a set of choices.  He could select status quo.  He could also choose to 
make the law more sophisticated.  Once deciding to change the status quo, 
he then chooses between a sophisticated law favoring P2 and a sophisticated 
law favoring P3.   
                                                 
46






P2 & P3 P2 & P3 P4 
Legislation Compliance Enforcement 
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B. Stage 2 
If P1 chooses to make the law more sophisticated, the game 
progresses to its second stage, where the law is gauged by those whose 
interests are potentially involved.  P2 and P3 will fall under the jurisdiction 
of the law.  Therefore, at stage two, each of the two players makes a choice 
between resisting the law and not resisting the law.47  The two players have 
their own political power.  If the resistance trumps the efforts of P1, the law 
fails, and the game ends at status quo.  Otherwise the law is promulgated and 
set for enforcement. 
C. Stage 3 
P2 and P3 are faced with the new law and the choice between 
compliance and noncompliance.  
D. Stage 4 
After P2 and P3 have acted, P4 makes a choice between enforcing the 
law and not enforcing the law. 
 
Payoffs for the players vary.  Everything else being equal, P1 wants to 
make the law more sophisticated.  By doing so, P1 increases judicial 
authority and prestige.  But if the draft or interpretation fails, P1 incurs costs, 
such as wasted time and human capital and damage to judicial power.  In 
short, P1 makes his choice based on the perceived probability that the draft 
or interpretation will trigger resistance and the institutional power of the 
resisting player.  
At stage two, P2 and P3 take a close look at the draft or interpretation 
and decide whether or not to resist it.  There are costs associated with 
resistance at this stage, for example, the cost of gathering political support to 
stop the proposed legal change.  Therefore, as strategic actors, P2 and P3 
look ahead to later stages and estimate the subsequent costs they will incur 
when the law is enforced, which should be the probability of enforcement 
times the sum of the benefits and costs.  If for one player the future costs are 
higher than the costs of resisting at stage two, he will resist at this stage, 
                                                 
47
  The resistance is a simplification of all the efforts used by P2 or P3 to oppose the proposed 
change.  It may include vetoing the draft or interpretation, amending the constitution, threatening to change 
the judicial institutions, to name just a few.  The concrete form of resistance depends on the political 
structure of the country in discussion. 
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provided that his efforts will nullify the draft or interpretation.  Otherwise, 
he will allow the draft or interpretation to be put into effect.  
When the law is set for application, P2 and P3 make a choice between 
compliance and noncompliance.  Since the change is assumed to be in favor 
of one of the two players, it is often the other player that makes the actual 
choice.  For example, if the legislature in China passes a bankruptcy law that 
gives higher priority to secured credit instead of workers’ compensation, 
secured creditors who are typically state-owned banks and other financial 
institutions, and workers’ unions will decide whether or not to comply with 
the new law.  Since the law favors the banks, it is the unions that make this 
calculation.  They can choose not to comply by, among other things, seizing 
the assets of the debtor or blocking the resale of the collaterals.  In the game, 
the decisions of P2 and P3 vary according to the sum of costs and benefits of 
compliance, and the expected level of enforcement.  For instance, if the costs 
are high and the expected enforcement level is low, they are better off not 
complying.  
At stage four, P4 chooses between enforcing the law and not 
enforcing it.  The costs of enforcement depend on a variety of factors such as 
legal professionalism, litigants’ relative institutional power, and judicial 
authority.  Presumably, in a rule of law environment where the local courts 
are more powerful and independent, there are more incentives for legal 
enforcement.  This is also true in a context where the litigants are of similar 
institutional power and the courts play a more neutral role. 
Depending on the payoffs present, backward induction reveals several 
possible outcomes of the game.  At the enforcement stage, P4’s decision is 
based on the general institutional environment and the relative power 
distribution between P2 and P3.  
 









Strong Rule of Law Enforce Enforce 
Weak Rule of Law Not Enforce If Law Favors The Less Powerful Enforce 
                                                 
48
  In this paper, vertical power distribution describes the situation where one of P2 and P3 controls 
significantly more legislative power and resources than the other. 
49
  In this paper, horizontal power distribution describes the situation where P2 and P3 control similar 
legislative power and resources.  
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As shown in Table 1, in a strong rule of law environment, the 
professional norms are strong; the judiciary is powerful and independent.  P4 
has an incentive to enforce the law, and it matters little how power is 
distributed between the litigants.  
In a weak rule of law environment, however, P4’s decision depends 
on the power distribution between the litigants.  If P2 and P3 are both 
powerful actors, the court50 can have a say even if its institutional power is 
weak.  In this horizontal power distribution, the court can function as a 
tiebreaker between P2 and P3.  But if the power distribution between P2 and 
P3 is vertical, that is, one player is significantly more powerful than the 
other, then the court’s decision turns on which party the law favors.  If the 
law favors the more powerful, the court will not hesitate to enforce it.  But if 
the law favors the less powerful, then the court is in a feeble position to 
enforce it.   
At the compliance stage, P2 and P3 make a choice between 
compliance and noncompliance.  Their decision at this stage turns on the 
outcome at the enforcement level.  As we have seen, in a strong rule of law 
context, the law is to be enforced.  So P2 and P3’s decisions turn on the 
difference between the cost of compliance and the cost of noncompliance.  
In a weak rule of law context, we get a similar outcome if P2 and P3 enjoy 
relatively equal political power.  If, however, P2 has more institutional 
power than P3, and if the law favors P3, then both P2 and P3 know that P4 
will not enforce the law due to the substantial costs.  With this expectation in 
mind, P2 will choose noncompliance.  It is trivial that P3 will choose 
compliance, or at the least be indifferent between the two choices, since the 
law favors him.51 
Going one step backward to the legislation stage, P2 and P3 make a 
choice between resisting and not resisting.  Again, their decisions depend on 
the outcomes at the subsequent stages.  In a strong rule of law context, the 
reasonable expectation is that the law will be enforced, and compliance 
probably is the better choice for P2 and P3.  In that case, their decision at the 
legislation level turns on the probability of successfully blocking the draft or 
interpretation, and the cost of compliance.  In other words, P2 or P3 will 
choose to resist if and only if:  
                                                 
50
  P1 is often legal scholars, officials in Beijing, or judges of the highest court; here the court refers 
to the local or regional adjudicative body. 
51
  I assume that the cost associated with compliance is lower than that associated with 
noncompliance if the law favors the party. 
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(probability of successful blocking) * (cost of compliance)  
≥ (cost of blocking) 
The lower the cost of blocking, the higher the probability of successful 
blocking, and the higher the cost of compliance, the more likely the 
condition is satisfied, and the more likely P2 or P3 will choose to resist. 
The same applies to the situation where there is weak rule of law, but 
horizontal power distribution between P2 and P3.  If one of the players 
successfully blocks the draft or interpretation, then the model reverts to 
status quo.  Since P2 and P3 take adversarial positions under the proposed 
law, there is no prisoners’ dilemma problem for resisting the draft or an 
interpretation.52  
In a weak rule of law context, if the law favoring the weaker player is 
not expected to be enforced against the more powerful one, the latter has no 
incentive to resist at the legislative stage.  
Going back to the first stage, drafting and interpreting, P1 makes a 
choice among maintaining status quo, making a more sophisticated draft or 
interpretation favoring P1, or making a more sophisticated draft or 
interpretation favoring P2.  Holding other factors constant, P1 wants to 
change the status quo and make a law that brings the judiciary more prestige 
and power.  If the draft or interpretation is successfully blocked, however, 
P1 suffers the waste of time and resources.  If the draft or interpretation goes 
through the legislative stage, P1 gets the credit for it.53  Therefore, P1’s 
decision turns on the probability of P2 and P3’s choosing to resist.  If P1 
expects the draft or interpretation to be successfully blocked by one player, 
then he is better off either choosing status quo, or making the law favoring 
this player, based on the context.  Ultimately, P1’s decision turns on the 
outcomes in all the subsequent stages and the payoffs determined by the 
context of the game.   
Below are two game trees that illustrate the scenarios that will be 
discussed in the empirical evidence section. 
                                                 
52
  For an introduction of prisoner’s dilemma, see Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner & Randal Picker, 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).  Generally, the dilemma describes a situation in which two prisoners 
are charged with a crime for which the prosecutor lacks sufficient evidence to convict.  Given the model’s 
conditions, the game theory result of the dilemma is such that the best choice for either of the prisoners is to 
confess, no matter what the other one does, though collectively, it is better for both to choose not to 
confess.  
53
  In the model, I simplify the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.  I use the verb 
“block” to represent a wide range of legislative acts that have the effect of nullifying or modifying the 
effect of a legal interpretation.  Such acts may take the form of modifying extent statutes or amending the 
constitution.  The form depends on the political structure.  In China, for instance, the People’s Congress can 
intervene and veto a Supreme Court interpretation. 
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Variables: 
F2:      Draft or Interpretation Favoring P2  C: Compliance 
F3:      Draft or Interpretation Favoring P3  NC: Noncompliance 
SQ:    Status Quo     E:  Enforce 
R:        Resist      NE: Not Enforce 
NR:     Not Resist 
Payoffs: 
P1:  a     P2: b 
P3:  c     P4: d 
1. Scenario I  
(1) Weak Rule of Law Context;  
(2) Vertical Power Distribution with P2 Being More Powerful;  
(3) P1’s Preference: F3>F2>S.Q.  
Plus the following conditions of payoffs: 
 a11>Max (a1, a2, a4, a5, a6, a7); 
 b11>Max ( b3, b8, b9); 
 d11>d10. 
Game Tree 1. 
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2. Scenario II  
(1) weak rule of law context & horizontal power distribution; or, strong rule of 
law context; 
(2) (probability of successful blocking) * (cost of compliance) ≥ (cost of 
blocking) satisfied; 
(3) Player 1’s preference: F2< >F3>S.Q. 
plus the following conditions of payoffs: 
 a1>Max (a2, a3); 
 b3>b8>b10; 
 c2>c4>c6; 
 d4>d5; d6>d7; d8>d9; d10>d11. 
Game Tree 2. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INTERACTIVE THEORY 
This section presents five empirical comparisons of different laws, 
countries, and regimes that support the interactive theory discussed in the 
last section.  First, while holding the subject of law constant, an analysis is 
made of how the variation in power distribution and legal authority affects 
the substance of the law.  The reason that China seems to have more 
restrictive laws against police nonfeasance is that local officials did not 
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expect the law restraining the government to be enforced.  Second, the 
differences between the making of comprehensive bankruptcy and 
administrative laws in China support the contention that the written law is a 
variable of its expected enforcement, which is further determined by the 
power distribution between potential parties.  Third, a comparison of the 
making of insolvency law in China and in Vietnam shows that unlike China, 
Vietnam established a set of comprehensive bankruptcy codes in a short time 
because the codes were less likely to be enforced in Vietnam.  Fourth, the 
politics behind the police liability law in the United States illustrate how 
power distribution in a rule of law context determines the way the United 
States Supreme Court interprets the American Constitution.  Last, the 
changes in the governmental liability law in South Korea after the country 
experienced political transformation show that the legal code may favor the 
more powerful when the rule of law is more consolidated.  
A. The Supreme People’s Court of China Favored Broad Interpretation 
of Governmental Liability Law 
In this subsection, I discuss the preference of the Supreme People’s 
Court of China for a broad interpretation of governmental liability law.  I use 
this empirical case to show that, as my model predicts, the distribution of 
political power of potential litigants implicated by a legal change, plus the 
weak rule of law environment, explains why citizens in China are ostensibly 
better protected by the law against official nonfeasance than their American 
counterparts. 
In this empirical case, Player 1 is the Supreme People’s Court.  
Scholars generally agree that judges tend to maximize the institutional 
power of the judiciary when possible.  As a group, judges share certain 
interests, which include promoting judicial independence, influence, and 
authority.54  Most scholars believe or assume that courts want to protect their 
legal autonomy from political bodies.55  This is true even in an authoritarian 
regime such as China, where judges of the Supreme People’s Court make 
efforts to promote the rule of law, though the efforts are constrained.   
The leaders of the Court have received legal education at prestigious 
law schools in China and abroad.  The current president of the Court, Xiao 
Yang, graduated from one of the best law schools and was once head of the 
                                                 
54
  Karen Alter, Who Are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and the European 
Court of Justice, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 121, 129-130 (1998). 
55
  Tom Ginsburg, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 75 (2003).    
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Ministry of Justice.56  During his term, the ministry initiated a nationwide 
legal-aid system in China.  A 1998 report said that “lawyers engaging in 
legal aid work had handled 70,677 cases, and responded to more than 
431,000 requests for legal information in 1997.”57  Xiao and other officials 
held the view that establishing a legal aid system was a prerequisite to China 
developing a mature legal system.58  In 1999, the Supreme People’s Court 
published the “Outline of Five-Year Reform” that aimed at promoting the 
power of judiciary by taking concrete measures such as “implementing 
public trials,” “enhancing the independence of judicial panels,” and 
“publishing court judgments.”59   
In China, legal specialists are usually responsible for drafting new 
laws.  Like their peers sitting in the Supreme Court, these specialists 
normally favor a stronger and more independent judiciary.  Wang comments 
that “Chinese legal academics are increasingly vocal in their calls for 
changes to China’s legal system . . . .”60  A community of legal specialists 
has emerged, as their number keeps growing.  The community’s  
“particularized expertise supports powerful dynamics of group identity, 
poses significant challenges for the regime’s control over the content and 
direction of legal reform.”61 
Player 2 refers to government officials whose behavior falls under the 
jurisdiction of the drafted or interpreted law.  They can resist the law at the 
People’s Congress, or do it at the local level when it is applied.  Although 
the legislature in an authoritarian regime tends to be regarded as a rubber-
stamp institution, it functions well as a bargaining forum among different 
power groups within the regime.  If compromise cannot be reached, a 
proposal made by one group may very well be struck down by another.  
Player 3 refers to citizens who may be victims in police nonfeasance cases.  
Since China is essentially an authoritarian state, citizens are only weakly 
represented in the national legislature.  Finally, Player 4 refers to judges of 
local and regional courts.  They choose between applying the law and not 
applying it according to the interpretation or the guidelines of the Supreme 
People’s Court. 
                                                 
56
  See official resume of Xiao Yang, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-
03/01/content_295423.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
57
  Benjamin Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 211, 212 n.5 
(1999).   
58
  Id. at 222-23. 
59
  Liming Wang, The Achievements and Prospects of Court Reforms in China, 1 FRONT. LAW CHINA 
3-4 (2006). 
60
  Liebman, supra note 29.  
61
  Pitman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW 
& SOCIAL INQUIRY, 465, 482 (2004). 
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For the reasons given below, officials are better off complying with 
the interpretation at the higher level and resisting the law at the local level.  
And local judges, due to the weak rule of law environment and the power 
distribution, choose not to apply the law. 
Institutionally, local courts are dependent on local governments.  The 
chief judge of a local court is appointed by a small group of leaders of the 
local government, which also controls a huge proportion of the expenses of 
the courts, including judges’ salaries.62  The quality of local courts is 
generally low.63  The majority of local judges do not have a college 
education or any formal training in law:64   
A 1998 study of nine basic-level courts (the lowest level) in a 
major provincial city revealed that only three percent of the 
judges had a bachelor’s degree in law.  The “great majority” 
had held other types of jobs in the court administration such as 
bailiff, clerk, or driver before being promoted to the rank of 
judge.65  
As a consequence, local judges in China do not share strong professional 
values or norms.  In other words, they do not assign a high value to the duty 
of protecting the politically less advantaged, or following the order of the 
higher court.  Moreover, the media is fully controlled by the state.  For fear 
of revenge, the local press rarely reports negatively about local officials.66  
In short, heavy institutional reliance, in addition to the lack of 
professionalism and media monitoring, naturally lead to the lack of judicial 
authority of local courts.  The following empirical evidence illustrates the 
severity of local judicial reliance.  Beginning in 2002, an intermediate court 
in Zhejiang Province experimented with transferring jurisdiction in 
administrative cases.  With the approval of the intermediate court, a case 
filed in town A will be adjudicated by the local court in town B, with town A 
and B in the same jurisdiction of the intermediate court.  In the year before 
the experiment, government officials lost only 13% of all lawsuits.  When 
administrative cases were transferred to a different jurisdiction, the 
                                                 
62
  Donald Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 97, 107 
(2003). 
63
  William P. Alford, Tasseled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in the 
World of Chinese Legal Workers, THE CHINA QUARTERLY, Mar. 1995, at 22, 36-37. 
64
  Id. at 31. 
65
  Clarke, supra note 62, at 108. 
66
  See Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2005). 
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percentage jumped to 64.4%.  Yet the characteristics of the cases did not 
change significantly.67   
In a dispute with government officials, P3 citizens are disadvantaged 
by their weak political status.  In China, local officials are normally 
appointed by higher-level CCP secretaries.  Due to the absence of a 
meaningful electoral process, these officials are not held accountable to local 
residents.  Therefore, the power relationship between the victims in official 
malfeasance or nonfeasance cases and the responsible government agencies, 
is often vertical.  This imbalance of power is mirrored in the courts.  Besides 
the institutional reliance of local courts and the subsequent biases against 
citizens, victims in administrative cases are also disadvantaged in terms of 
the legal resources available to them.  Though the Ministry of Justice has set 
up a nationwide legal aid system, which was intended to be composed of 
quasi-independent organizations, the program has “concentrated in 
economically developed urban areas.”68  In addition, local officials can use 
various means to keep citizens from learning about the laws and regulations 
that they deem threatening.69  Although some argue that the growth of media 
in China ameliorates the problem of information control, it is also 
recognized that once an issue is considered by the party as damaging to its 
legitimacy, the media will remain quiet.70 
In administrative cases not related to police inaction, local 
governments have additional ways to bypass the law.  The Communist Party 
and party officials in China are not subject to administrative litigation, even 
though the party always has the final say in major policies, local or 
national.71  This party immunity sometimes allows local authorities “to 
deflect lawsuits.”72  Abstract administrative acts are not reviewable either.  
As a result, local judges “can only [maneuver] around a handful of so-called 
‘concrete administrative acts,’ and dare not undertake big moves on the 
numerous general actions based on ‘policies.’”73 
In sum, given all these institutional features, the costs of 
noncompliance with the law are very low for local government officials.  
Meanwhile, the expected low level of compliance, the high level of 
                                                 
67
  Duan Hongqing, Deng dai zui gao fa yuan chai qian si fa jie shi, Caijing, June 7, 2004, available 
at http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20040607/1238799895.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
68
  Benjamin Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 211, 214 
(1999). 
69
  Liebman, supra note 29. 
70
  See Liebman, supra note 66, at 122-23. 
71
  O’Brien & Li, supra note 19, at 80. 
72
  Id. 
73
  Id. 
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institutional reliance, rampant corruption, and the low level of 
professionalism all counsel local courts not to enforce the law when local 
officials are the defendants.  Certain features of the judicial system afford 
local courts “the choice of accepting or declining a case.  This power is 
somewhat akin to the institution of summary judgment in its gate-keeping 
function, but quite unlike it in that it is not governed by any consistent set of 
principles.”74  Local judges often decline to adjudicate a case if substantial 
interests of local government are at stake.  Even if the court accepts a case, it 
is very difficult for the plaintiff to win without resorting to non-legal 
means.75  Consequently, the law is widely regarded as a “frail weapon” that 
has not been very effective.76  In short, the best choices at the local level are 
for P2 government officials not to comply with the law, and for P4 local 
judges not to enforce the law.  In addition, the low costs at this level reduce 
the incentive for P2 to resist the drafting or interpreting of the law at the 
central level.  Since the law is aimed at restraining government officials, P3 
citizen representatives at the National People’s Congress are not motivated 
to block it.  Expecting weak resistance, P1, the Supreme People’s Court, 
pushed the envelope by signaling its preference for the legal interpretation 
that favors victims of official nonfeasance.  To the Court this is a better 
choice because justices are motivated to maximize judicial authority and get 
credit for establishing legal restraints on the authoritarian state77 (see Game 
Tree 1).  
The evidence thus far appears to endorse the argument that laws do 
not matter in China, and therefore are easy to make.  This argument over-
simplifies the issue, however.  Laws matter as a label of legitimacy, 
especially when they are used by the politically powerful to further their 
interests, or when they regulate the relationship between parties of similar 
political status.78  When there is horizontal power distribution between the 
litigants, i.e., Player 2 and Player 3 have similar institutional capacity, even a 
weak court can function as a tiebreaker by enforcing the law.  As illustrated 
earlier, in such a context, Players 2 and 3 make their calculations the same 
way as if in a strong rule of law environment.  The high cost of compliance 
                                                 
74
  Clarke, supra note 62, at 109. 
75
  See Bing Gan, Guangxi gao yuan wei he zan bu shou li 13 lei an jian, Ren min wang, Aug. 24, 
2004, available at http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14748/2733920.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) 
(Provincial high courts in China normally have internal rules regarding the general types of cases lower 
courts should not accept.  One such rule was revealed by the media in 2004.  It contained thirteen types of 
cases, most of which involve the substantial interests of local governments). 
76
  O’Brien & Li, supra note 19, at 76. 
77
  See infra, Game Tree 1. 
78
  See infra, Table 1. 
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will motivate the player whom the law disfavors to choose to resist at the 
legislative stage.79  For this reason, some laws, in contrast to the 
administrative laws, have only passed the Chinese legislature after more than 
ten years of drafting and redrafting.  This is the case with the making of a 
new bankruptcy law in China.  
B. The Making of a New Bankruptcy Law in China Shows the 
Shortcomings of the Over-Simplified Theory that Laws in China Do 
Not Matter 
The making of a new bankruptcy law in China shows the 
shortcomings of the over-simplified theory that legal change in China 
progresses at a rapid rate because the laws are not applied.  Like the 
administrative law discussed in Section I, the new bankruptcy law will be 
applied in a weak rule of law environment.  My model posits that the 
drafting process took more than ten years because of the horizontal power 
distribution of the potential litigants. 
When a law is proposed and drafted, if the power distribution between 
Player 2 and Player 3 is relatively horizontal, the model predicts the law will 
be applied at a higher level.  If the cost of compliance is high, the player 
whom the law disfavors will strongly resist the draft at the legislative stage.  
As a consequence, the draft will not pass as easily as any of the 
administrative laws.  
From 1949 to 1986, no bankruptcy law existed because of the planned 
economy.  In 1986, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise 
Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation) was passed by the legislature for the 
purpose of increasing efficiency of state-owned companies, and only applied 
to state-owned enterprises.80  Five years later, the People’s Congress 
approved the PRC Civil Procedure Law, “with Chapter XIX applying to the 
bankruptcy of [non-state-owned] enterprises with legal person status.”81  A 
few other Chinese laws also contain clauses that touch on the issue of 
bankruptcy.  Chapter VIII of the PRC Company Law stipulates liquidation 
                                                 
79
  In the game theoretical setup, at the Legislation Stage, the player whom the law disfavors will 
resist the law if and only if: (probability of successful blocking) * (cost of compliance) ≥ (cost of blocking). 
80
  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo qi ye po chan fa (shi xing) [Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial 
Implementation)] art. 2, Ch. 1 (1986) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.scsdaj.gov.cn/dac/pdfbak/ 
zxl45l19861202.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
81
  Charles Booth, Drafting Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies: Recent Developments 
in China and Vietnam, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 94 (2004).  
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procedures.82  Article 71 of the PRC Commercial Bank Law provides that a 
commercial bank can be declared bankrupt if permission of the Banking 
Regulatory Commission is granted.83  The laws that compose China’s 
insolvency regime are “short and incomplete.”84  Thus, “it should not be 
surprising that there are many inconsistencies as well as gaps and omissions” 
in these laws.85  This problem is further exacerbated by the fast-growing 
economy, which changes significantly the forms of business organization 
and the performance of state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”).  The Supreme 
People’s Court has needed to issue numerous interpretations to meet the 
demand of a fast growing market economy.86  
In response to the inadequacy of the trial bankruptcy law, the Chinese 
government began a review of the Bankruptcy Law as early as in 1994, and 
a comprehensive draft was completed in 1995.  The national legislature did 
not pass it at that time.  Since then, a number of drafts have been written and 
circulated for comments.  Some drafters complained of the delay in the 
legislature after eight years of drafting.87  There was much speculation that 
the law would have passed in 2004,88 but it was not until August 27, 2006 
that the Chinese People’s Congress enacted the new Corporate Bankruptcy 
Law.89  Why was this process so different from the making of administrative 
law discussed earlier?  The interactive theory best explains the dramatic 
difference.  
Holding other variables constant, the preferences of Players 1, 2 and 3 
are the following:  P1 prefers a more sophisticated bankruptcy law than 
status quo.  P2 hopes to see a law promoting his interests.  If this is not 
available, then status quo is preferred over a law favoring P3.  For P3, the 
preference ranking is: a law favoring P3 > status quo > a law favoring P2. 
The institutional context for bankruptcy cases is the same as that for 
administrative ones.  The major difference is that Player 3 is not a powerless 
                                                 
82
  See id. at 98.  See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo gong si fa [Company Law], Ch. X (2005) 
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-10/28/content_85478.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 
2007). 
83
  See Booth, supra note 81, at 99.  See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo gong shang ye yin hang 
fa [Commercial Bank Law] art. 71, Ch. 7 (passed 1995, amended 2003) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1040/2267854.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
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  Booth, supra note 81, at 99. 
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  Id. 
86
  Li Shuguang, Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years, 5 HARVARD ASIA 
QUARTERLY (2001), available at http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/95/40/. 
87
  Yang Ye, “No Bankruptcy After Eight Years, Drafter Complains,” Economic Monthly, June, 
2002. 
88
  “New Bankruptcy Law Is Coming,” China Economic Weekly, Vol. 42, 24 (2004). 
89
  China Enacts New Bankruptcy Law, BBC NEWS, August 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/business/5291910.stm.  
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citizen, but institutional creditors, mainly state-owned banks.  Player 2 
represents business enterprises and their workers’ unions, both backed by 
local governments.  In the making of a new bankruptcy law, unlike 
administrative laws, any deviation from the status quo may benefit one 
player at the expense of the other.  Therefore, both Player 2 and Player 3 
may have incentives to resist the law when it is drafted.  Also, in China, the 
group of creditors is led by state-owned banks that are politically powerful 
in the legislature.  They have the institutional strength to put up significant 
resistance to the drafting and passage of a law that is perceived to be against 
their interests.  In addition, the small number of national banks reduces the 
costs of collective action and makes the resistance at the higher level more 
consistent and powerful.90  In other words, both the probability of successful 
blocking and the cost of compliance are high.  Therefore, it is more likely 
for the banking sector to choose “Resist” at the legislative stage when the 
draft law is perceived to be against their interest and the enforcement level is 
high.  
Unlike in the United States, there are no specific bankruptcy courts in 
China.  Judges dealing with such issues are members of the local courts (P4).  
They are not necessarily any more professional, independent, or corruption-
proof than their peers presiding over administrative cases.  
In an administrative case, the defendant is normally a government 
official.  Plaintiffs, either unorganized citizens or companies, are in a 
politically disadvantaged position under the authoritarian political system, 
both at the local level and in the legislature.  For the reasons discussed 
above, the administrative laws, when used by this politically weak group, do 
not pose serious challenges to the local government.  As a result, the laws 
largely remain unused.  In contrast, a new bankruptcy law is expected to 
regulate parties of relatively similar political powers.  
A bankruptcy case usually involves a company and a group of 
creditors.  In China, the former almost always has the support of the local 
government and the latter are often led by state-owned banks.  The close 
symbiosis of local government and local business in China has been well 
documented.91  A widely held view on the dramatic economic development 
in China is that local governments  
                                                 
90
  For basic ideas of the collective action problem, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
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91
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of China’s Transitional Economy, 101 AM. J. SOC. 263 (1995); Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform and the 
Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99 (1992); Jiahua Che & 
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treat enterprises within their administrative purview as one 
component of a larger corporate whole.  Local officials act as 
the equivalent of a board of directors and sometimes more 
directly as the chief executive officers.  At the helm of this 
corporate-like organization is the Communist Party secretary.92  
Due to this symbiosis,  
if investments are made wisely, local governments can meet 
expenses, keep a portion of the extra tax revenues (at the 
townships and county levels) and enjoy larger amounts of extra-
budgetary non-tax revenues . . . . [T]hat has made township and 
village enterprises such a lucrative source of income for local 
governments and why they are so enthusiastically promoted.93   
In other words, the incomes of the officials at these levels are “directly 
affected by the performance and growth of their rural enterprises.”94  
As discussed earlier, local courts have strong incentives to cooperate 
with local governments to further their interests.  Expecting green lights 
from the judges, local governments often coordinate with bankrupt 
enterprises to over-compensate workers with the assets of the entity so that 
the laid-off employees will not be a financial burden.95  Since employee 
settlement often left little money from the creditors, “state-owned banks, 
which are the main creditors of SOEs, are often hit hard by SOE 
bankruptcies.”96  Also, fraudulent bankruptcy, in which local governments 
help local enterprises evade debts with the protection of local courts, is 
widespread.97  In these cases, the assets of bankrupt enterprises normally 
turn into properties of local government or corrupt government officials.  As 
Li notes, “legal mechanisms to guarantee creditor's interests are weak at 
best.”98 
The latest draft of the new bankruptcy law was intended to be 
uniformly applicable in par with the international standards.  Agreement 
could not be reached on several key issues including the priority of the 
interest of secured creditors vis a vis workers’ compensation, and the 
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appointment of bankruptcy administrators, who will be granted substantial 
power and discretion in managing bankruptcy under the new law.  State-
owned banks want the administrators appointed by a creditor’s committee, 
and other groups want them appointed by the local courts.  This is a strategic 
decision made by the banks to mitigate the influence of the local interests 
and the power of local courts.  The concern of the creditors is that if the draft 
favoring more judicial discretion in bankruptcy cases were passed, the 
current collusions between local courts and local government would have 
additional legitimacy and would be more difficult to detect.  With the 
bankruptcy administrator appointed by the creditor’s committee, the power 
distribution at the local level will be more horizontal, and the enforcement of 
the law will be more neutral.  The appointment issue is the most contentious 
one, and it has not yet been fully resolved.99 
In contrast to the governmental liability law, local governments 
cannot afford to ignore a draft insolvency law that is preferred by the 
banking sector and let it pass the legislature.  This is due to the relatively 
strong political power of the national banks.  Although local governments 
have the support of local courts, state-owned banks are powerful political 
institutions.  Armed with a more favorable bankruptcy law, they can mount a 
meaningful challenge to local officials.  As discussed earlier, one means is 
appointing a bankruptcy administrator from cities or provinces that are not 
under the influence of the local government.  The banks could also use the 
law to impose pressure on higher-ranking regional and provincial judges or 
officials.  In short, the distribution of political power on the two sides of the 
game is more balanced than the one in the administrative law context.  Each 
party considers favorable legal code important.  As a result, each party 
strongly resisted the passage of a drafted law that was perceived to be 
against their interests.  Therefore, it took more than ten years for a new 
bankruptcy law to materialize in China.100 
Although the content of a draft law matters in that more sophisticated 
provisions tend to be better applied, since rights and obligations are clarified 
in more situations, the comparison between the drafting and interpretation of 
the insolvency law and the law on governmental liability in China shows 
that in a setting of a weak rule of law, the power distribution among 
potential parties to a case matters as much as the law itself.  If the law is to 
be used by the politically weak against the strong, the probability of its real-
world enforcement is low.  If the law is to coordinate the relationship 
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between parties of similar political status, or be in favor of the politically 
strong, the probability of its enforcement is high.  If that is the case, the 
party that will be disadvantaged by the law will have strong incentives to 
resist the law at an earlier stage, i.e. the legislative level, preventing it from 
being put into effect. 
C. The Making of Bankruptcy Law in Vietnam Supports the Interactive 
Theory 
This subsection discusses the recent process of making a 
comprehensive insolvency law in Vietnam, which has an institutional setup 
almost identical to China.  The major difference between the two countries, 
which led to the swift legislation of a bankruptcy law in Vietnam, is that in 
Vietnam the bankruptcy law was not expected to be applied because the 
potential litigants have not developed distinguished group interests.  As I 
will show, this empirical case supports the argument that legal environment 
and the distribution of political power explain how laws are drafted, 
interpreted, and legislated. 
Vietnam and China resemble each other in many aspects relevant to 
this analysis.  Both countries are ruled by communist parties, whose 
legitimacy depends largely on developing the national economy.  Both 
countries are embedded in the Asian culture, in particular Confucianism.  
Both experienced foreign invasions and national liberation through military 
struggles in recent history.  The institutional setups of the two countries are 
the same.  All political powers, according to their constitutions, belong to a 
people’s legislature,101 which is dominated by the communist party of each 
country.102  Both are carrying out export-oriented economic reforms, and the 
Vietnamese government copied many of the reform policies made by its 
Chinese counterpart.103  The major difference is that Vietnam started its 
bankruptcy reforms about a decade later than China,104 and the payoffs for 
each party in the game are different in Vietnam. 
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In Vietnam, as in China, some established legal professionals are 
dedicated to the promotion of judicial power.105  However, authoritarian rule 
is more heavy-handed in Vietnam.106  Although private business is 
blossoming, the government has more control of the national economy than 
its counterpart in China.  Corruption is also more rampant, and the judiciary 
is virtually a tool of the party.107  A World Bank study shows high levels of 
corruption in China, with more severe problems in Vietnam.108  In Vietnam, 
court management and judge selection fall under the authority of Ministry of 
Justice.109  Given all these factors, it is little surprise that the World Bank 
concludes that the rule of law is even weaker in Vietnam than in China.110  
The differences in these factors, i.e. more state control of the 
economy, lower level of legal professionalism, less judicial independence, 
and more corrupt officials, determine that payoffs for P2 and P3 in Vietnam 
are not the same as in China.  And as my model predicts, Vietnam has a 
more developed and unified bankruptcy law than does China.  
Vietnam began drafting a bankruptcy law in 1992 “with the goal of 
creating a ‘uniform, complete legal system.’”111  It took less than two years 
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Rule of Law 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
China 0.50 0.35 0.42 0.28 0.41 
Vietnam 0.55 0.94 0.77 0.47 0.60 
Control of 
Corruption 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
China 0.00 0.20 0.38 0.40 0.59 
Vietnam 0.68 0.67 0.78 0.71 0.81 
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for the law to be enacted and implemented.112  The law applied uniformly to 
both SOEs and non-SOEs.  Booth believes that the Vietnamese law is “more 
expansive than the Chinese approach in that it applied to both legal person 
and non-legal person enterprises.”113  However, this seemingly 
comprehensive law was almost never utilized.114   
Booth suggests four reasons for the dormancy of the law,115 and they 
all point to the tight control of SOEs by the state, lack of judicial autonomy, 
and the lack of awareness of the Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law.  When the 
state directly manages the majority of the SOEs, courts are bypassed in 
insolvency issues.  Judges in Vietnam “played the ‘central and decisive’ role 
in bankruptcy proceedings—from appointing the members of the trustee 
committee to chairing the creditors' meeting,”116 but only seventy such cases 
were recorded from 1994 to 2002.117  Most of the insolvent SOEs either 
received subsidies or were dissolved directly by the state.  As a result, local 
governments and local courts were not involved.  In other words, the state 
protected the interests of creditors from predation by local officials.  
Meanwhile, given the ineffective court system, most of the private firms did 
not bother going through the legal process.118  Viewed through the 
theoretical framework of the paper, we see how low usage of a law led to its 
swift drafting and legislation.   
To improve upon the 1993 law, the Vietnamese government drafted a 
new bankruptcy law in 2002.  After much progress was made, the Vietnam 
Law on Bankruptcy was enacted in 2004.119  Booth compares five areas of 
the draft insolvency law in China, which finally passed the legislature on 
August 27, 2006, and the new bankruptcy law in Vietnam.  Apart from some 
minor differences, both laws impress him as modern and comprehensive, 
much better than their previous versions.  Not surprisingly, Booth sees more 
checks and balances built into the Chinese law, while the Vietnamese Law 
does not reflect such a compromise.120 
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The comparison between the making of Vietnamese bankruptcy law 
and the Chinese bankruptcy law strongly support the argument that in a 
weak rule of law environment, laws are easy to make if they are not 
expected to be applied.  This link between law making and law enforcement 
does not exist if the distribution of power between potential litigants is 
horizontal, as is the case with the Chinese bankruptcy law.   
D. The Politics of the United States Supreme Court Opinions on Official 
Nonfeasance Support the Interactive Theory 
The United States provides an application of the interactive theory in 
a strong rule of law context, where potential litigants of a contemplated legal 
change are more likely to resist legislation if they expect the change to have 
a negative impact when applied.  Taking the resistance into consideration, 
those in the position to make the change will take great precaution to prevent 
legislation unfavorable to their position.  As a result, laws on the books in 
strong rule of law countries may not look as favorable to state citizens as 
laws in countries with a weak legal environment.  
Compared to China and Vietnam, the payoffs for each party in a 
strong rule of law country such as the United States are different in many 
ways.  First, better rule of law means stronger legal professionalism and 
more judicial independence.  The cost-benefit analysis for judges, P1 and 
P4, is different.  American judges, more than their counterparts in China, 
adhere to the principles of following the law and doing justice.  This is not to 
suggest that American judges are better individuals with higher levels of 
morality; they are simply embedded in a different institutional environment.  
Also, because of free media and better monitoring system, corruption is not 
as rampant in the United States as in China.  
Empirical evidence shows that while state courts sometimes deviate 
from Supreme Court decisions,121 lower federal courts are largely consistent 
in applying federal law.122  P2s are also better-trained officials compared to 
those in China, and are subject to monitoring by free mass media, judicial 
review, and in some situations, a democratic electoral mechanism.  Research 
has found that to federal bureaucrats, obeying the law is almost always 
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considered the most desirable thing to do given the costs and benefits shaped 
by the institutions:  
Federal government agencies complied with 93.2 percent of the 
Supreme Court’s opinions and narrowly complied with 6.8 
percent of opinions.  Also, bureaucracies never defied nor 
evaded any of the Court’s decisions, meaning that agencies 
never failed to incorporate at least some aspect of the Court’s 
legal rules into their implementations.  The agency responses 
that manifested narrow compliance did not flout the Court’s 
authority but they interpreted its opinions in self-interested 
ways. . . . When the Court writes legal rules adverse to agency 
interests, government bureaucracies usually faithfully interpret 
and implement them.123  
Recent research also hypothesizes that government officials anticipate lower 
court decisions and change their actions accordingly.124  
Moreover, once the law is made, individuals are more likely to use it 
to protect their interests.  Unlike in China, where victims of official 
nonfeasance are seriously disadvantaged both inside and outside the 
courtroom, the American legal system affords ordinary citizens relatively 
equal standing against government officials in front of a judge, both at the 
federal and the state level.  In the last few decades, there has also been a 
dramatic movement towards greater legal consciousness and the assertion of 
legal rights.125  As a result, a new Supreme Court decision will trigger more 
cases to be brought in lower courts against federal or state officials. 
In addition, studies demonstrate that government officials make cost-
benefit analyses.126  Government agencies’ compliance with the Court 
depends on the characteristics of the implementation environment, as such 
characteristics affect agencies’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of how 
to respond to the Court.127  If the cost of compliance is too high, they are 
better off resisting the law through other channels, for example through the 
legislature.  Scholars observed that if powerful groups are hurt by Supreme 
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Court decisions, they opt to resist through Congress.128  If the Court expects 
strong resistance by officials at a higher level, it must consider the 
consequence of the legislature's reaction.  After all, the judiciary relies on 
other institutions for its rules to be implemented.129   
This reliance suggests that if the legislature strongly opposes a ruling, 
the legislature can nullify it by changing the Constitution, making a new law 
that bypasses or partially reverses the court decision, or changing the 
institution of the Court.130  Ignagni and Meernik demonstrate that Congress 
is usually successful when confronting the Court.131  Although their 
evidence is somehow compromised by the self-selection problem, which 
means Congress responds assertively only when its members expect to win 
in a battle against the Court, the overall evidence “does indicate that 
Congress is ready and capable of striking back at the Court when it deems 
necessary.”132  Moreover, if confrontation with Congress is to be avoided, a 
rational Court will pay deference to state and local governments when they 
opt to protect their interests through the judicial channel.   
Scholars have shown that not only did states and localities 
appear before the Supreme Court more often, they also won a 
higher proportion of their cases . . . . Importantly, they were 
victorious in 55% to 70% of all their Supreme Court cases since 
1970.  The only parties consistently doing better as appellants 
during the 36-year period were minorities, unions, and the 
federal government.  The [state and local government] success 
rate as respondent was exceeded only by that of the federal 
government.133 
In short, in a strong rule of law environment such as the United States, laws 
are expected to apply.  Studies have shown that the Court faces meaningful 
resistance from the legislators if the ruling is against the interest of their 
constituencies.  To avoid a show-down, a rational Court will pay deference 
to state and local governments when possible.  
Applying this reasoning to the laws on governmental liability for 
police inaction, once the court imposes a positive duty on the police to 
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protect individuals, the costs and benefits for implicated officials will change 
significantly.  Law enforcement under such a rule would incur considerably 
higher costs.  For instance, in New Jersey alone, the courts issued 34,698 
and 36,071 temporary restraining orders in 1999 and 2000 respectively.134  If 
the Supreme Court in Town of Castle Rock had found the failure to respond 
to the restraining order was a violation of procedural due process, 
significantly more victims of police nonfeasance would have a colorable 
constitutional claim.  As a result of the increased threat of lawsuits, 
legislators representing the interest of law enforcement officers will resist 
through the legislature.  Since state governments have substantial interests in 
this matter, they would react too.  Anticipating strong resistance from state 
and local governments either in court or through Congress, the Supreme 
Court has declined the invitation to create a federal constitutional right for 
individuals to receive police protection. 
In sum, because of the stronger rule of law environment in the United 
States, the full impact of the Court decision would, inter alia, substantially 
increase the costs for government officials, which makes them better off 
resisting the decision at the legislative level.  Anticipating strong resistance 
from other branches and the high costs of confronting them, the Supreme 
Court opted not to tie the hands of the officials too tightly.  To be more 
specific, the expected resistance would be too strong for the Supreme Court 
to make police inaction a constitutional violation.  As a result, the Court has 
never upheld such a claim, either under the guise of substantive due 
process,135 or as procedural due process.136  The court notes that state 
legislatures are welcome to make such laws.137 
While laws against official nonfeasance are almost nonexistent in 
America, official malfeasance is subject to judicial punishment.  Congress 
enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 to check the tortious acts 
committed by the federal government.138  Given the strong rule of law 
context, the statute reasonably contains a long list of provisions aimed at 
ensuring that federal officials are only liable for clear malfeasance and the 
federal government is not overburdened.  Limits on the government burden 
include that the United States “shall not be liable for interest prior to 
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judgment or for punitive damages;”139 sets the attorney fees to less than “25 
per centum of any judgment rendered;”140  and confers immunity to officials 
when they are exercising or performing a “discretionary function or duty on 
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government.”141  Fully 
aware of the potential resistance from federal officials through the 
legislature, the Supreme Court has been careful not to strictly interpret this 
“discretionary function.”  It stipulates that to fall into the exception, a 
government act must “involve[ ] an element of judgment or choice” and “be 
‘based on considerations of public policy’ or at least ‘susceptible to policy 
analysis.’”142  “This test has allowed the discretionary function exception to 
swallow much of the liability that the FTCA purports to create.”143  The 
same rationale applies to the judicial politics of Section 1983, which “creates 
a cause of action for the deprivation of federal rights ‘under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.’”144  In 
coordinating the relationship between the federal government and state 
governments, the Court is better positioned to assert more judicial authority.  
In Monroe v. Pape, the Court found a cause of action against thirteen police 
officers of the City of Chicago who violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights by breaking into their homes and mistreating them.145  The Court held 
the city government could not be liable as Section 1983 lacked legislative 
intent to include municipalities.146  This ruling triggered waves of litigation 
against state and local officials.  Quite naturally, the Court in later opinions 
“attempted to stem the tide of litigation by developing jurisdictional 
limitations on these suits.”147  
In sum, the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme People’s 
Court of China, embedded in different contexts, took counterintuitive actions 
with regard to laws on police nonfeasance.  With weak institutional power, 
low quality courts at the local level, unclear statutes, and powerful officials, 
the Chinese Supreme Court signaled its preference for broadly interpreting 
the laws on governmental liability and favored the rule that police officers 
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owe a positive duty to protect individual citizens.  In contrast, with strong 
institutional power, high quality federal courts at the circuit and district 
levels, flexible constitutional provisions, and more law abiding government 
officials, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the claim that the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution affords any remedy to individual citizens 
who are victims of police nonfeasance.  This counterintuitive contrast, if 
viewed from the game theoretic perspective discussed in Section III, is 
perfectly reasonable.   
E. Changes in the Governmental Liability Law in South Korea Support 
the Interactive Theory  
Recent changes to the governmental liability law in South Korea 
show, as predicted by the interactive theory, that a supreme court composed 
of a group of highly dedicated legal professionals, combined with vertical 
power distribution between potential parties, and weak rule of law can lead 
to ostensibly high level of judicial restraint on government officials.  The 
interactive theory also predicts that once the legal environment improves, the 
court will relax the judicial restraint due to its costly application. 
Since the ceasefire of the Korean War, South Korea has experienced 
one of the most remarkable political and economic transformations in human 
history.  From a backward colony of Japan, South Korea grew into a 
powerful industrial country and joined the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development after only three decades of development.148  
Soon after the war, the United States government set up a democratic polity 
in the southern peninsula.  This government was short-lived.  A military 
general took over the power and started an authoritarian rule that lasted for 
almost thirty years, which was interrupted only by military coups and 
assassinations.  In the 1990s, however, South Korea went through a 
relatively peaceful democratization.149  As the political institution 
transformed, so did the power allocation within the system.  This 
transformation created an ideal test ground for the proposed theory.  As 
noted earlier, the theory predicts that a group of highly dedicated high court 
judges, vertical power distribution of potential litigants, and a weak rule of 
law can lead to an ostensibly high level of legal restraint on government 
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officials.  And when the contextual factors change, so do the ostensible legal 
constraints.  
In general, Korean judges are more professional than their peers in 
China.  The selection process is based purely on merit, reflected by passage 
of the bar examination.  Records show that “from 1949 to 1980, in a thirty-
year period, a total of only 1902 candidates passed the bar examination, an 
average of fifty-nine a year, for a population of 30 to 40 million people.”150  
This reflects an average passage rate of one to two percent.151  In the last two 
decades, the number of legal professionals increased, but the change was 
slow.152  Many of the successful candidates graduated from the same elite 
law school, and all are trained for two years after the bar exam at the Judicial 
Research and Training Institute, which naturally strengthens the appreciation 
of a collective goal and solidifies professional norms.153  As a result, judges 
are held by the society to higher intellectual and moral standards.154  The 
best illustration of the professionalism of high court judges in Korea is their 
challenge, or self-sacrifice, to the authority of a military dictator.  In 1971, 
the Supreme Court tested the limit of its power by holding Article 2 of the 
National Compensation Act unconstitutional.155  The decision was later 
overruled by a Constitutional Amendment.  All the justices who had agreed 
on the unconstitutionality of the law in the case were denied a second 
term.156  This series of interaction between the Supreme Court of Korea and 
the authoritarian state illustrates the professional commitment of the judges, 
the institutional weakness of the Court, and the heavy rule of the state before 
democratization.  
In the last three decades, Korea transformed from a military 
dictatorship into a liberal democracy.  Throughout this period, as the power 
distribution of the actors changed, so did the payoffs of different strategies in 
this law-making game.  A survey of the governmental liability law in South 
Korea reveals evidence that supports the hypothesis presented in this article.  
Given the high professional commitment of Korean judges, it was 
unexpected that its Supreme Court would go as far as its counterpart in 
China by preferring the rule that police officers owe a positive duty to 
                                                 
150
  Dae-Kyu Yoon, Korea, in ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 162, 181 (Poh-Ling Tan ed., 1997). 
151
  Id. 
152
  Id. at 182. 
153
  Jae Won Kim, The Ideal and the Reality of the Korean Legal Profession, 2 ASIAN-PAC L. & POL’Y 
J. 45, 49 (2001). 
154
  Id. at 54-55.  
155
  Won Woo Suh, Governmental Liability in Korea, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON GOVERNMENTAL 
LIABILITY IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 9, 11 (Yong Zhang ed., 1999). 
156
  Kun Yang, Judicial Review and Social Change in the Korean Democratizing Process, 41 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1, 1-2 (1993). 
372 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 2 
 
individuals who ask for protection from third-party tortious acts.  During 
authoritarian rule, however, the Court imposed high nominal standard on 
government officials.  Until 1996, the Court had consistently held that 
“public official[s] [were] liable for compensation to the injured party even in 
cases of minor negligence.”157  Yet this tight rule was loosened after the 
legal environment in the country improved qualitatively.158  Suh notes that:  
Changes have taken place in respect of the position of the court 
regarding the liability of the public official to compensate the 
injured party. . . .  
[O]n February 15, 1996, the plenary body of the Supreme Court 
handed down a judgment to the effect that public officials will 
be liable for compensation only in cases of deliberate acts or of 
gross negligence.159  
In other words, the Supreme Court of Korea moved from more closely 
resembling the Supreme People’s Court of China to become more like the 
United States Supreme Court after the country democratized.  This change is 
as predicted by the interactive theory.  That is, a supreme court composed of 
dedicated legal professionals, vertical power distribution between potential 
parties, and weak rule of law can lead to ostensibly high level of judicial 
restraint on government officials.  Once the legal environment improves, 
however, the court will relax the judicial restraint due to its costly 
application. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The more laws and orders are made prominent, 
The more thieves and robbers there will be. 
                                                             Tao Te Ching v.57 
 
William Alford, a Harvard law professor specializing in comparative 
law, cites these two lines in his article “The More Law, The More . . . ? 
Measuring Legal Reform in the People’s Republic of Law.”160  He suggests 
that scholars drop the easy assumption that more legal codes lead to a better 
rule of law, and subsequently, more economic development.  This article 
                                                 
157
  Suh, supra note 155, at 17. 
158
  According to the annual reports by Freedom House, political rights and civil liberties have 
expanded in South Korea since 1972.  FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (1972-2006), available 
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls.   
159
  Suh, supra note 155, at 17. 
160
  Alford, supra note 38, at 122. 
MARCH 2007 LAW, POWER DISTRIBUTION, AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 373 
 
suggests that Alford is partially right.  There indeed exists a correlation 
between rapid legal reform and the weakness of law enforcement.  Laws are 
easy to make when they are made to be ignored.  A theory based solely on 
this simple correlation is incomplete, however, since even in a setting of 
weak rule of law, legal codes matter if they regulate the relationship between 
parties of similar political status.   
In this article, I created a game that incorporated four players, one 
who drafts or interprets laws, two parties who are implicated by the legal 
change, real or contemplated, and one who enforces the law.  By studying 
how the four players interact in the conceptual game setup when different 
payoffs are assigned, we can resolve more empirical puzzles and predict 
how laws change in response to changes in other factors such as the legal 
environment or the distribution of power of potential litigants.  Empirical 
evidence from China, Vietnam, the United States, and South Korea support 
the interactive theory.  The empirical evidence and the theory indicate that 
the real effect of significant changes in law is often limited when the 
judiciary is weak and when the power of potential litigants is unevenly 
distributed.  
 
